rence of this newly defined disease, it would be difficult to detect if outcomes were determined only according to the presence or absence of injury events, as opposed to this more refined measure.
Further, in the development ofmultivariable etiological models, one guiding principle is never to adjust for variables unless we understand how they relate to both the exposure and the outcome. If one accepts our proposition (that we are not measuring this outcome appropriately), this means that we may not be developing appropriate etiological models. We might be considering variables as risk factors contributing to the occurrence of disease when, in fact, they are actually part of the disease process. Adjustments for these variables could lead to biased estimates of risk being attributed to the underlying risk factors. More importantly, this would lead to inappropriate recommendations for preventive intervention. How would an epidemiologist study risk taking disease? Comparing the rate of events per unit (or degree of) exposure to postulated risk factors is a basic epidemiological tool when examining aetiology. Defining disease by exposure to risk factors is, therefore, likely to be circular. If risk taking disease is defined as above, then the relevant risk factor/exposures are those that might predict this particular combination of primary exposures (that is, risk taking disease). There is a danger that rates of this disease per unit of secondary risk factor exposure will fail to predict ultimate injury outcomes. For instance, injury and secondary exposure could be independently related to its frequency (that is the disease may be a confounder). Furthermore, in experimental studies, the disease might be 'cured' by altering the physical environment in which somebody lives! Dissent Can this disease actually be located in an individual? There might be utility in talking of risk taking disease as if it affects whole societies (disease of living together), or whole environments (disease of this place), or of particular 'vectors' (disease of lorries or guns), rather than a person. The location of the disease in a person is not necessary, except insofar as the ultimate manifestation (that is injury) is represented by a breakdown in individual homoeostasis. Furthermore, if this kind of social or environmental 'measles' can occur-anywhere on the 'skin' of a group of people, then which individual is actually affected may be rather arbitrary (driver versus passenger versus pedestrian) and may misrepresent the 'location' of the problem.
Conclusion
How does risk taking disease fit accepted definitions of disease? 'In medical discourse, the name of a disease refers to the sum of the abnormal phenomena displayed by a group of living organisms in association with a specified common characteristic or set ofcharacteristics by which they differ from the norm of their species in such a way as to place them at a biological disadvantage'.'
In discussing his definition based on Karl Popper's 'methodological nominalism', Guy Scadding makes some interpretations pertinent to risk taking disease. First, there is the question of 'biological disadvantage'. This might appear to be a crucial problem for this disease when there are no symptoms or physical signs. However, Professor Scadding makes it clear that a disease can be represented by a poor statistical prognosis rather than current depressed health status. Thus it is, 'permissible to say that someone has a symptomless disease. Most people over middle age have symptomless athero-sclerosis. This is properly regarded as a disease, since as a group those with it have a shorter life expectancy than those who do not, although many individuals will suffer no evident ill-effects from it and live to die of some other disease'. In this sense, persistent and detectable characteristics of individuals that convey future statistical risk among a group of them can be termed a disease. Here may be part of the problem insofar as the word 'outcome' is being equated with disease. It would seem to be perfectly legitimate to conduct observational and experimental epidemiological studies to determine the aetiology of particular types of behavior with respect to hazardous environments. However, a necessary condition for much progress to be made in this direction is that the final outcome measure -that it, injury -is known to be unequivocally related to such exposure. So how could we progress? Does injury, as defined by 'the transfer of energy at rates and in amounts above or below the tolerance of human tissues' have any definitional problems? In common usage there are deficiencies -for instance the attribution of intent in 'unintentional injury' is not only difficult, but conflicts with the required separation of disease and cause. There are also boundary problems between traumatic injury and those suffered during suffocation and poisoning. However, perhaps the most important ofthe criticisms of this commonly accepted definition of injury is the lack of requirement for 'biological disadvantage'. Does 'illness' necessarily follow from trivial injuries?
Misclassification ofa disease is almost certain if the lower band of 'clinical severity' is left undefined. Every one of us has some minor injury during a month if recording is sensitive enough. This is homoeostasis at work, and the equivalent of recording sneezes and wheezes. The crucial requirement is that those 'injury' victims with the case definition chosen will demonstrate some 'biological disadvantage' that will allow them to be accurately ascertained. The most likely current problem with our aetiological models is that we have not taken this fundamental step when capturing case material for case-control or cohort based studies of injury risk factors. For case material in observational studies it cannot be adequate to use undifferentiated emergency room attenders or hospital admissions. Either of these definitions will selectively ascertain individuals biased by propensity to come from nearby localities, from younger age groups, or from socially deprived backgrounds.3 What is more, that most powerful aetiological tool, the experimental study, will be seriously blunted when ascertainment of the 'outcomes' can vary over time due to intercurrent changes in the thresholds for attendance and admission to 14arvis hospital, often driven by access/supply factors. Do we really believe that the number of empty hospital beds causes injury?
Deaths are not much better -case fatality rates from equally severe injuries vary by place and, for severe head injuries, have probably halved in the last 10 years. What we need to know is whether children with an injury severity score of 25 or greater as a result of pedestrian/motor vehicle collisions have changed in frequency over time before claiming success for our efforts at prevention (or for any other aetiological factor!).
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